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Abstract
By providing effective access control mechanisms, enterprise information se-
curity technologies have been proven successful in protecting the sensitive
information in business organizations. However, such security mechanisms
typically reduce the work productivity of the staff, by making them spend
time working on non-project related tasks. Therefore, organizations have
to invest a signification amount of capital in the information security tech-
nologies, and then to continue incurring additional costs. In this study, we
investigate the non-productive time (NPT) in an organization, resulting from
the implementation of information security technologies. An approximate an-
alytical solution is discussed first, and the loss of staff member productivity
is quantified using non-productive time. Stochastic Petri nets are then used
to provide simulation results. Moreover, sensitivity analysis is applied to
develop a cost-effective strategy for mitigating the negative impact of im-
plementing information security technologies. The presented study can help
information security managers to make investment decisions, and to take ac-
tions toward reducing the cost of information security technologies, so that
a balance is kept between information security expense, resource drain and
effectiveness of security technologies.
Keywords: access control, non-productive time, queuing theory, stochastic
Petri nets, security investment decision
Preprint submitted to Journal of Information Security and ApplicationsSeptember 27, 2019
1. Introduction
Many organizations have to maintain sensitive information or documents
that can only be accessed by authorized personnel; for example, personal
health records in medical centres, and bank account details in financial orga-
nizations. Sensitive information leakage and distortion have been identified as
one of the major information security threats that cause reputation damage,
identity theft, and can even undermine the viability of the company (Dolya
(2006)). It is therefore essential that companies and organizations keep such
information and documents safe. Enterprise information security technolo-
gies (e.g., USB access control solutions and digital rights management soft-
ware) have been developed to address these concerns, for example, by using
encryption to restrict the access to protected document.
It is generally accepted that organizations have to invest a signification
amount of capital and continue to incur operational expenditure in the area
of enterprise information security technologies. Moreover, since these tech-
nologies do have negative effects on the efficiency of the organization, it is
necessary to demonstrate that the benefits arising from their introduction
exceed the costs of information security investment.
Information security research has been traditionally focused on the tech-
nologies and products; for example, the architecture of the system, access
control policies, and the functionality of the products. Nowadays, however,
human behaviour has been identified as one of the critical factors that deter-
mine the effectiveness of security measures, and information security tech-
nologies can clearly impact the users in a negative way (Adams and Sasse
(1999); Schneier (2000); Kirlappos and Sasse (2014); Sasse et al. (2016);
Beautement et al. (2016)).
Information security technologies use access control measures (e.g., user-
names and passwords) to limit unauthorized use of data resources. However,
due to various reason, even authorized users might be unable to open a pro-
tected resource they want to access. In such a case, they need to seek help
from the administrators employed by an organization. In this paper, we
will investigate performance both of the service provision and human admin-
istrators in the organization, and the productivity loss resulting from the
implementation of enterprise information security technologies, especially we
focus on the impact of failed access control in the organization.
There exist different methods for addressing security investment deci-
sions; for example, Beres et al. (2008, 2010) used mathematical models and
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stochastic simulations to examine the effectiveness of security operation pro-
cesses and protection mechanisms. Beautement et al. (2009) proposed to
use economic models based on trade-off between information confidentiality,
integrity and availability in order to assess the effectiveness and value of secu-
rity investment in an information system. However, none of them considered
the cost of administrators in the information help desk and the productivity
loss in the organization. Parkin et al. (2008) indicated that the unavailability
of system components and staff members would bring productivity loss in the
organization. However, the measurement of productivity loss is very vague in
this study. Reinecke et al. (2010) proposed a framework for the definition of
benefit-based adaptivity metrics. However, they did not consider the metrics
to evaluate the productivity loss. In addition, Wolter and Reinecke (2010)
present standard performance metrics and discuss proposed security metrics
that are suitable for quantification. However, the authors only considered the
metrics to evaluate the server components, they did not consider the users.
Zeng and van Moorsel (2011) proposed to use non-productive time (NPT)
as a standard tool to analyze the productivity loss, and the firing delay of
stochastic Petri nets to quantitatively evaluate the NPT when implementing
Digital Right Management (DRM) products in the organization’s network.
Zeng (2019) indicted that an important advantage of the implementation of
an information security technology is the reduction of unauthorized attempts
to access data resources, and NPT is an important intangible cost of the or-
ganization. However, none of these studies analyzed the performance and
cost of administrators.
The main aim of the study reported in this paper is to consider the
trade-off between performance and security when implementing information
security technologies in the organization’s network. Firstly, an approximate
analytical model of the information security system comprising a server and
an administrator is proposed and evaluated using queuing theory. An NPT
function for implementing information security technologies is also given.
Moreover, a simulation model based on stochastic Petri nets is proposed
and evaluated. Secondly, we consider the case of multiple administrators
and provide suitable analytical and simulation models which are then com-
pared. Thirdly, a cost function is proposed to analyze the effect of varying
the number of administrators in the information system. Fourthly, sensitiv-
ity analysis is applied to determine which of the parameters exerts the most
influence on the NPT of the organization. This study can help an infor-
mation security manager to estimate the necessary number of administrators
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providing system support, and the service capacity that has to be guaranteed
by the organization in order to satisfy a given number of users.
This document is organized as follows: Section 2 will introduce the work-
ing mechanism of the enterprise information security technologies; Section 3
will present a queuing network model to analyse the implementation of in-
formation security technologies; Section 4 is an approximate solution of the
system comprising the server and an administrator in the information help
desk; Section 5 is background on stochastic activity networks; Section 6 is a
stochastic activity network model for information security technologies; Sec-
tion 7 will analyse the value of variables in the model and the sensitivity of
non-productive time of the system; Section 8 will compare the approximate
analytical solution with simulation results; Section 9 will analyse multiple
administrators in the system; A cost function will be proposed in Section 10
to analyse the information help desk; Section 11 is the conclusions.
2. The Implementation of Information Security Technologies
Parkin et al. (2008) survey the existing enterprise technologies that con-
trol access to confidential digital data (e.g., USB access control solutions,
digital rights management software, and disk encryption techniques). The
researched technologies use endpoint access control as a means of limiting
the maintenance overhead introduced by unauthorized devices. The tech-
nologies are installed from a centralized security station, sending client-side
installations directly to user workstations. They provide auditing options
and prevent outsider access through encryption. The various information
security solutions follow a model of centralized control, where access policies
are recorded at a single location from which they are passed to end users
when they interact with the network, and administrators have the highest
access rights. The various information security measures rely on the cooper-
ation of various people and system components, thus carrying them out has
an impact on the overall productivity of the organization.
Figure 1 shows a possible model representing the relationships between
users, administrators and servers when implementing information security
technologies in the organization’s network: (1) When a user tries to access a
resource, a request is sent to the server. (2) The server attempts to validate
the user and, if the user does not pass the authentication procedure, the user
is denied the access the resource. (3) If the access is denied, the user contacts
administrator asking for help. (4) The administrator contacts the server. (5)
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Figure 1: Relationships between administrators, users and servers.
If the user should be allowed to access the resource, the administrator creates
the appropriate access rights for the user, or changes the usage policy for this
user in the server. (6) Finally, the administrator sends the access rights to
the user.
In our models and experiments presented in the rest of this paper, we
have adopted a simplified version of the model depicted in Figure 1.
3. Queuing Network Model
In this section, we will introduce a queuing network model to describe the
relationship between users, administrators and servers. Queuing network
models is an important tools in design and analysis of computer systems,
due to the fact that, queuing network models achieve a favourable balance
between accuracy and efficiency (Mitrani (1998)).
Figure 2 shows an enterprise information security system modelled by a
simple queuing system with two queue stations – a single server Tser and a
single administrator Tadm. User’s request arrive at the server, wait in the
queue if necessary, receive service from the server, and depart.
In the system, each user’s request is assumed to have a duration specified
by a negative exponential distribution with a given mean: 1/ru is the fre-
quency for a user send an access request, 1/rser is the average time it takes
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the server to serve a user’s request, and 1/ra is the average time it takes the
administrator to help a non-active user. N is the maximum number of users
admitted for processing. If there are more than N requests present, the ones
that do not occupy a thread wait in an external first in first out queue.
In the diagram, p (0 < p ≤ 1) is the probability that a user can pass
the user authentication procedure on the server and become an active user,
1− p is the probability that a user cannot pass the user authentication and
becomes an non-active user who needs help from the administrator.
Figure 2: A queuing theory model of an information security system.
When the external queue is non-empty, the system behaves like a closed
queuing network (Figure 3), with N requests circulating between the users
and the system.
4. Approximate Analytical Solution
Let us assume that there are k user requests circulating between the
server and the administrator (k = 1, . . . , N). Suppose that the circulation
continues for a long time, i.e., the system reaches a steady state with k user
requests. Then the server queue would behave like an M/M/1 queue with
Figure 3: A closed queuing theory model of an information security system.
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a bounded buffer of size k. Therefore, the frequency for users send access
requests in the system is k
ru
.
The load ρser on the server is:
ρser =
ruk
rserp
(1)
Using the existing results (Mitrani (1998)) for the M/M/1/k queue yields
the queue length (the average number of requests, both waiting and receiving
service) in the server:
Lser =
ρser
1− ρser ×
1− (k + 1)ρkser + kρk+1ser
1− ρk+1ser
(2)
The steady state probability Πk that there are exactly k requests waiting for
a response from the server is:
Πk =
(1− ρser)ρkser
1− ρk+1ser
(3)
Therefore, the state-dependent throughput (the rate at which users pass
through the service) of the server when there are k requests in it, Tser , is
given by:
Tser = (1− Πk)× ruk
p
=
1− ρkser
1− ρk+1ser
× ruk
p
(4)
The utility User (the proportion of time the server is busy), given that there
are k requests in the system is:
User =
Tser
rser
=
1− ρkser
1− ρk+1ser
× ruk
rserp
(5)
The average response time, Wser , of a request that is admitted into the server
can be found from Little’s theorem:
Wser =
Lser
Tser
(6)
The entire system is in a steady state. Thus, the load on the administrator,
ρadm is:
ρadm =
(1− p)ruk
rap
(7)
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Therefore, the state-dependent utility of the administrator when there are k
requests in the system, Tadm , is given by:
Uadm =
1− ρkadm
1− ρk+1adm
× (1− p)ruk
rap
(8)
and the average number of requests on the administrator is given by (Mitrani
(1998)):
Ladm =
ρadm
1− ρadm ×
1− (A+ 1)ρAadm + AρA+1adm
1− ρA+1adm
(9)
where, A = (1− p)k.
The average response time, Wadm , of a request that is admitted into the
administrator can be found from Little’s theorem:
Wadm =
Ladm
Tadm
(10)
NPT is the average time taken by users to send the requests, the time
of requests queue in server station and administrator station, and the time
services provided by the server and administrator during a time interval.:
NPT = (
Lser
rq
+ Lser + Ladm)× l (11)
where, l is a period of time of the system, 1/rq is the average time taken by a
user to send an access request, k is the number of users in the organization.
5. Petri Nets and Stochastic Activity Network
Queuing theory has been used extensively for the evaluation of computing
systems, but their application to systems that exhibit complex concurrency,
fault tolerance and degradable performance is not straightforward (Sanders
(1988)). Extensions to Petri net, on the other hand, have proved to be
valuable tools for evaluation of systems that exhibit these properties. Many
of these extensions have included the addition of an explicit representation of
time. This permits the representation of both performance and dependability
related characteristics, depending on the interpretation given to the tokens
in the model.
In this section, we will show the definition of Petri nets and stochastic
activity nets which is a class of stochastic Petri nets.
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5.1. Petri Nets
Petri nets are a graphical modelling tool for a formal description of sys-
tems whose dynamics are characterized by concurrency, synchronization, mu-
tual exclusion and conflict (Marsan et al. (1995); Murata (1989)). In par-
ticular, they have been widely used for structural modelling of work-flows
and have been applied in a wide range of qualitative and quantitative an-
alyzes (Marsan et al. (1995); Salimifard and Wright (2001); van der Aalst
(1998)).
A basic Petri net N consists of two types of nodes, Pl and Tr , respectively
called places and transition, a set F ⊆ (Pl × Tr) ∪ (Tr × Pl) of arcs that
connect the nodes, and the initial marking M0 : Pl → N which is a mapping
from the set of places to the set N of all non-negative integers.
Input arcs start at places and end at transitions, while output arcs start
at transitions and end at places. Places can contain tokens, which are used
to simulate the dynamic and concurrent activities of the system modelled by
the net. The current state of the modelled system (a marking) is given by
the number of tokens in each place.
Transitions are the active components of the net. When a transition is
executed (or fired), it consumes tokens along its input arcs, and produces
tokens along its output arcs. The resulting movement of the tokens changes
the states of the system. A transitions is only allowed to fire when it is
enabled, which means that each input place holds at least one token.
One can associate a firing delay with each transition of a Petri net; such
a delay specifies the time that the transition has to be enabled before it can
actually fire. If the delays are given by a random distribution function, we
obtain a stochastic Petri net.
5.2. Stochastic Activity Networks
Stochastic Petri nets extend the classic Petri nets with timing and proba-
bility features, and stochastic activity networks (SANs) are a class of stochas-
tic Petri nets (Sanders (1988, 2018)).
SANs consist of four primitive objects: Activities, places, input gates and
output gates. Activities (‘transitions’ in Petri net terminology) are two types,
timed and instantaneous. Elongated ovals represent timed activities and solid
bars represent instantaneous activities. Timed activities are used to repre-
sent activities of the modeled system, whose duration impact the system’s
ability to perform. Instantaneous activities represent system activities which,
relative to performance variable in question, complete in a negligible amount
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of time. Places are depicted as circles and, as with Petri nets, each place can
hold a non-negative number of tokens.
Cases (a generalization of probabilistic arcs) can be associated with both
timed and instantaneous activities and are represented by small circles. Cases
permit the realization of two types of spatial uncertainty. Uncertainty about
which activities are enabled in a given marking is realized by cases associ-
ated with intervening instantaneous activities. Uncertainty about the next
marking assumed upon completion of a timed activity is realized by cases as-
sociated with that activity. Input gates contain both an enabling predicate
and input function (on the marking of the places). The enabling predicate
must be true for the activity associated with that gate to be enabled. Upon
completion of the associated activity, the input function is executed, possibly
changing the marking of the net. Output gates have a single output function
(on the marking of the places) associated with them, which is executed upon
completion of the associated activity.
The stochastic nature of the nets is realized by associating an activity
time distribution function with each of the timed activities and a probability
distribution with each set of cases.
Reward models are used to specify measures of system behaviour. A re-
ward model consists of a stochastic process and a reward structure. The
stochastic process represents the dynamics of the system and can be con-
structed by hand or, automatically, from some network level description.
The reward structure is typically a set of one or more functions defined on
the states or transitions between states in the process.
A reward model in SANs has two different reward components: one is
concerned with ‘rate rewards’, that is, the rate at which reward accumulates
while the process is in a specified set of markings during an interval of time;
and the other is concerned with ‘impulse rewards’, based on the count of the
number of times an activity fires during an interval of time.
The functions used to capture the activity and marking based rewards in
a SAN, with places Pl and activities A, are given as follows:
- C : A → R. For each a ∈ A, C(a) denotes the reward obtained due to
the completion of activity a.
- R : P(Pl ,N) → R. For each v ∈ P(Pl ,N), R(v) denotes the rate of
reward obtained when for each (pl, n) ∈ v, there are n tokens in place
pl.
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where N is the set of natural numbers, and P(Pl ,N) is the set of all partial
functions from Pl to N.
Impulse rewards are associated with activity completion (via C) and rates
rewards are associated with the number of tokens in sets of places (via R).
In the following, variable types of the interval category are denoted by
‘Y’ while variables types of the time-averaged category are denoted by ‘W’,
each with the appropriate subscript. We let
Y[t,t+l] =
∑
v∈P(Pl,N)
R(v) · Jv[t,t+l] +
∑
a∈A
C(a) ·Na[t,t+l]
W[t,t+l] =
Y[t,t+l]
l
In the above, the reward accumulated is related to the number of times
each activity completes and time spent in particular markings, during a time
interval [t, t+ l].
- Jv[t,t+l] is a random variable representing the total time that the SAN
is in a marking such that for each (pl, n) ∈ v, there are n tokens in pl
during [t, t+ l].
- Na[t,t+l] is a random variable representing the number of completions of
activity a during the interval [t, t+ l].
6. Stochastic Activity Network Model
Figure 4 shows the structure of a stochastic activity network model rep-
resenting information security scenario we discussed. The model consists
of eight places, three timed transitions and three instantaneous transitions.
Timed transitions are associated with random exponential distributed firing
delays.
Authorized users try to access protected resources every 1
ru
unit time.
Place Users contains the users that may arrive to the queue. The tokens
in Users are the authorized users. We use Tu to control the frequency of
access requests sent by a user, thus each completion of activity Tu represents
the arrival of a request to the waiting room. Idle servers are represented by
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Figure 4: A stochastic activity network model of an information security system. Note that
the ‘thin’ transition with output places takes no time to execute, i.e., it is instantaneous.
Informally, the middle transition Tut produces a token with in one of the two output places
with probabilities p and 1− p, respectively.
tokens in place Idle server , busy servers are represented by tokens in place
Server . The time taken to access the protected resources is given by Tser .
The marking of Users determines the firing rate of the transition modelling
users arrivals, and the marking of Server determines the firing rate of the
transition modelling user departure.
If the user can pass the authentication process, then the user can use
the resource, however, if the user cannot access the resource, the user has
to contact the administrators for help. Place Af service contains all users
who went through the server, the probabilities on immediate transition Tut
represents the users passed the authentication process and the users did
not pass the authentication process. Idle administrators are represented by
tokens in place Idle adm, busy administrators are represented by tokens in
place Adm help. The time taken to help the users is given by Tadm . After
obtaining such help, the user can try to access the resource again.
The behaviour of the model can be measured by the impulse rewards
model and rate rewards model, which are supported by the Mo¨bius soft-
ware (Sanders (2018)).
The throughput of a transition is computed according to the formula
which is described in Section 5,∑
a∈A
C(a) ·Na[t,t+l].
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The number of tokens in sets of places is computed according to the formula∑
v∈P(Pl,N)
R(v) · Jv[t,t+l].
The time scale of the model is expressed in minutes, i.e., when we run the
model one time unit in Mo¨bius represents one minute in real working time.
To measure the throughput of the server, the throughput of a transition
per unit of time Tser was computed in average interval of time [t, t + l],
and then we could calculate the utility of the server by using the equation
(5). To measure the throughput of the administrator, the throughput of the
transition per unit of time Tadm was computed in average interval of time,
and then we could calculate the utility of the administrator by using the
equation (8).
This model will be used as base case model for sensitivity analysis later
in Section 7.
7. Sensitivity Analysis of Productivity Loss in the Organization
From the models we can see that NPT associated with enterprise in-
formation security technologies is related to a variety of parameters, which
are affected by the security policies and user behaviour in the organization.
Since these parameters have an impact on the organization efficiency loss, it
is of critical business importance for corporations to find out which param-
eter results in a large contribution to the overall output variability, so that
enterprise-wide security budget can be optimized to these factors in order to
minimize the cost (Anderson and Choobineh (2008)). Therefore, sensitivity
analysis is particularly useful in this situation.
We analyze the relative importance of each parameters by applying sen-
sitivity analysis to the stochastic activity network model. To get the aim of
the sensitivity analysis, three main steps are proposed:
Step 1 Building a base case model to simulate the business process by im-
plementing an enterprise information security technology. The base
case should incorporate the best bet values of all the input parameters.
Following an initial run with the base case model, a belief about the
optimal strategy can be formed (Pannell (1997)). This belief is also
based on the modeler’s perceptions of probability distribution of profit
for the preferred strategy.
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Step 2 Identify the base case, maximum and minimum value of the parameters
which we are interested in. If we analyze the sensitivity of {x1 . . . xn},
we use xbasi denotes the base case value of input parameter xi, x
max
i
denotes the maximum value of xi, and x
min
i denotes the minimum value
of xi. The output of the base case model is y
bas.
Step 3 Analysing the sensitivity of xi, xi is varied by using its maximum or
minimum value, while leaving all other parameters at their base values.
We calculate the output of the model, and assess the influences of
each input parameter relative to the output of the model 1. Thus, the
sensitivity of xi can be calculated as:
Positive part :
ymaxi − ybas
xmaxi − xbasi
Negative part :
ybas − ymini
xbasi − xmini
where xmaxi and x
min
i correspond to the output values y
max
i and y
min
i
respectively.
7.1. Base Case Model
Enterprise digital rights management (EDRM) is used as a case study
(Zeng and van Moorsel (2011)). When authorized users try to open protected
documents, the user needs a username and password in order to login to the
system. If the user can open the document they become an active user. If
the user cannot pass the document authentication or the user cannot pass
the user authentication, the user would contact the administrators for help.
After the user gets help from the administrators, the user would try to use
the document again.
The model we use is in Section 6. There are nine input parameters in the
model (Table 1). The first five parameters: The number of authorized users
1The units of measurement of different parameters might not be comparable, so there
cannot be absolute scopes with respect to changes in different parameters. This problem
can be overcome by measuring the percentage change in the output, divided by the per-
centage change in the input parameter. Therefore, the sensitivity coefficient is the ratio
of the change in output to the change in input while all other parameters remain constant
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Table 1: The input parameters of the model.
Parameters Value
1 Number of authorized users in the organization 50
2 Number of documents, a user might use every day on
average
4
3 Number of normal working hours per day 8
4 Number of working weeks per year 52
5 Number of administrators in the organization 1
6 Average time service need to serve each user 0.01s
7 Average time administrators need to help each user 4.5 min
8 Average time users need to pass user authentication 7.33 s
9 Percentage of time when authorized users experience a
login system failure and attempt ask administrator for
help
0.70 %
in the organization, the number of documents that an authorized user might
use every day on average, the number of normal working hours per day, the
number of working weeks per year, and the number of administrators, these
five parameters depend entirely on the size and business type of different
organizations. Therefore, the values of these parameters are determined by
literature based assumptions. Other four parameters of the model can be
gathered by previous research works and experiments.
Average time service need to serve each user : The values of this parameter
are the measurements from a real Google service (Dean and Barroso (2013)).
The Google search system updates query results interactively as the user
types, performing the search and showing the results within a few tens of
milliseconds. From a real Google service (Dean and Barroso (2013)), each
server typically responds in 10 ms (i.e. 0.01sc). The maximum response time
is 140 ms (i.e. 0.14sc), and the minimum response time is 1ms (i.e. 0.001sc).
Average time administrators need to help each user : This interview is
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taken in Newcastle University. All the students in the university have their
own username and password to access facilities, computers, and network in
the campus. When students experienced username and password issues, they
would go to the information help desk of the university and ask for help.
In the interview, the technical staff member in the information help desk
claimed that: It takes 1 or 2 min for the staff change a student’s password,
after changing the password, the password is available for use immediately.
Creating a new account for a student would take 5 or 10 min, which would
also be available for immediate use. If the username and password of en-
terprise Digital Rights Management product (EDRM) belong to the campus
domain, the procedure to creating or changing the username and password
would be the same as normal password changing and creating procedure.
In our study, the following assumption is made: after help desk staff
change or create a username and password for a user, the user can use the
username and password to open protected documents immediately and the
values of this parameter are uniform in distribution, thus we have (1+2+5+
10)/4 = 4.5 , which means the average time technical staff spend to change
or create a username and password is 4.5 min. The maximum time cost is
10 min and the minimum time cost is 1 min.
Average time users need to spend to pass user authentication: The partic-
ipants in the experiment were 30 students in Newcastle University: 5 Ph.D
students, 3 MSc students and 22 undergraduate students. Participants used
their username and password to log into their web based e-mail accounts, and
check their e-mail in the summer term at a computer cluster and students’
offices.
From the username and password setting rules in the Newcastle Univer-
sity: The login name is made up of ‘a’ or ‘n’ followed by the middle seven
characters of the Student Number . . . . The way to set a password: you need
something which is memorable, but not guessable. Think of a phrase of eight
words (or more) which contains at least one upper case (capital) letter and
at least one number, and then use the initial letters of the phrase.
Out of the 30 participants, the minimum time cost to login into their
student account is 4 s. The maximum time cost is 17 s, and the average
time cost is 7.33 s. We noticed that time cost of each student depended
on the length of the username and password, the strength of the password,
the character restrictions of the password and the frequency of using and
changing the username and password.
Percentage of time when authorized users experience a login system fail-
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ure: This parameter is based on the experiment in University College Lon-
don. They found that there are approximately 0.7% of login attempts that
can be expected to result in a help desk call, where passwords are re-set via
the information help desk (Brostoff and Sasse (2003)). The highest percent-
age of password reminder is 26.1%, and the lowest percentage of password
reminder is 0%.
The system reaches steady state under the parameters in Table 1, based
on equation (1) and (7):
ρser =
ruk
rserp
= 0.003497398 < 0
ρadm =
(1−p)ruk
rap
= 0.000024481 < 0
where the frequency for a user send an access request 1
ru
= 8×60
50×4 = 2.4,
number of users k = 50, the average time it takes the server to serve a user’s
request 1
rser
= 0.0001667 time unit, the average time it takes the administra-
tor to help a non-active user 1
ra
= 4.5, the probabilistic users can pass the
authentication process p = 0.993.
Let us now consider one year of work after the deployment of EDRM in the
network system of an organization, i.e., 124800 time units in the stochastic
Petri net model (this corresponds to 52 weeks of work, each working week
having 40 working hours). We measure the NPT, using equation (11), the
time users spend in any place other than Users is computed. The NPT also
includes the time the user takes for sending an access request ( 1
rq
).
We increase the number of users up to tens of thousands, using a discrete
approximation to keep the state space limited. That is, we assume 50 active
users circle around in the model, each representing a group of users as de-
termined by a model multiplier. By incorporating the multiplier correctly in
the various transition rates, we can approximate the behaviour of a system
with tens of thousands of users by a model that has less than one million
states. One million states is easily manageable with Mo¨bius tool (Sanders
(2018)).
Figure 5 shows the NPT of the system, for up to 25600 users. The NPT
includes: the time spent on sending an access request and authentication
procedures, and the time spent on waiting for a response from administrator.
Once the number of users rises above two thousand, the system starts to
deteriorate. A middle-size corporation that has 50 authorized users will incur
about 133.32 h of NPT.
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Figure 5: Total non-productive time (NPT) associated with the deployment of information
security technologies. NPT increases significantly when the number of users served by the
system increases.
7.2. Define Key Parameters
Table 2 lists the four parameters that will be investigated, more infor-
mation can be found in Section 8. They are variable numbers and could be
adjusted independently, which can be changed by the security policies of the
organization.
7.3. Sensitivity Analysis
Figure 6 shows the results of sensitive analysis for the parameters in Table
2. Sensitivity is calculated as the ratio between the relative change of model
output and the relative change of an input parameter. It has been found
that a small change of parameter 3 - Average time users need to spend to
pass user authentication contributes most to output variability. Parameter
1 - Average time service response time gives the smallest relative change in
the NPT.
8. Comparing Analytical and Simulation Results
We put the parameters in Table 1 into the model in Figure 4, and compare
the approximate analytical solution with simulation results obtained using
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Table 2: The Parameters for Sensitivity Analysis.
Parameters Highest Value Base Value Lowest Value
1. Average time service re-
sponse time
0.14 s 0.01 s 0.001 s
2. Average time administra-
tors need to help each user
10 min 4.5 min 1 min
3. Average time users need
to spend to pass user au-
thentication
17 s 7.33 s 4 s
4. Percentage of time when
authorized users experience
a login system failure and
attempt ask administrator
for help
26.1% 0.7 % 0%
the Mo¨bius system (Sanders (2018)). The performance of the system under
different loading conditions and parameter settings was examined in a series
of numerical and simulation experiments.
Figure 7 shows the utility of the server against the number of users for
both the simulation and approximate analytical approaches for various val-
ues of N (number of documents, a user might use every day on average).
Increasing the value of N corresponds to increasing the utility of the server.
Figure 8 shows the utility of the administrator against the numbers of the
users for both the simulation and approximate analytical approaches for vari-
ous values of N . Increasing the number of documents, a user might use every
day on average, corresponds to increasing the utility of the administrator in
the organization.
9. Multiple Administrators
In the above, we proposed an approximate analytical model for imple-
menting information security technologies. We considered one server and
one administrator. However, in a real life situation, the administrator would
have multiple tasks, which make them too busy to handle the access control
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Figure 6: The tornado chart is the sensitivity of four key variant parameters in the model.
The x-axis is the percentage change from the base case model of the sensitivity analysis.
This analysis is associated with the parameters in Table 2.
problems for information security technologies. In what follows, we consider
multiple administrators who provide help with access control problems.
We assume that there are K administrators, each of which can serve one
user request at a time, independently of the others (Figure 9). We want
to know if it is beneficial to increase the number of administrators, or to
increase the operational speed of the administrators. It is well known that
for an M/M/K queue, it is preferable to have one administrator serving at
the rate µ rather than K administrators serving at the rate µ/K (Mitrani
(1998)). This is because if there are fewer than K requests in the queue,
then some of the administrators will be idle, thus reducing the overall service
rate.
Consider first the administrator subsystem, with j requests circulating
between the server and administrators, j = 0, 1, . . . , (1 − p)N , where N is
the maximum number of user requests, and p is the probability that a user
can pass the user authentication on the server.
Suppose that the circulation continues for a long time and the subsys-
tem reaches a steady state with j requests. If there is one administrator
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Figure 7: Utility of the server w.r.t. the number of users in the system. The utility
increases significantly when the number of users served by the server and administrator
increases.
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Figure 9: A closed queuing theory model of an information security system, with N users
and K administrators.
in the system and j user requests in the subsystem, the approximation be-
comes an M/M/1/./A queue (A = (1− p)N). Hence the balance equations
become (Mitrani (1998)):
(A− j)ruΠj = raΠj+1, 1 ≤ j ≤ A (12)
where Πj is the steady state probability that there are exactly j user requests
waiting for a response from the administrator.
Now we increase the number of parallel administrators in the model. The
model becomes an M/M/K/./A queue, where K is the number of adminis-
trators. Therefore, the balance equations become (Mitrani (1998)):
(A− j)ruΠj = (j + 1)raΠj+1, 0 ≤ j < K (13)
(A− j)ruΠj = KraΠj+1, K ≤ j < A (14)
We can calculate Π0:
Π0 =
[
K−1∑
j=0
A!ρj
(A− j)!j! +
A∑
j=K
A!ρj
(A− j)!K!Kj−K
]−1
(15)
The average queue length can then be calculated by (Mitrani (1998); Zhao
and Thomas (2010)):
Ladm =
∑A
j=1 jΠj
= A!Π0
[∑K−1
j=1
ρjj
(A−j)!j! +
∑A
j=K
ρjj
(A−j)!K!Kj−K
] (16)
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Each of the users submits requests to administrators at the rate (1−p)ru
p
.
Therefore, the throughput Tadm is (Mitrani (1998)):
Tadm = (A− Ladm)ruA
p
(17)
and the average response time of administrators, Wadm , becomes:
Wadm =
A
Tadm
− p
ruA
(18)
The non-productive time (NPT) in the organization can be calculated
using the equation (11).
We again used the Mo¨bius software (Sanders (2018); Deavours and Sanders
(2001)) to simulate the behaviour of the approximate analytical model, and
to compare the simulation and analytical results.
We recall Figure 4, shows the structure of a stochastic Petri net for the
analytical model we have just discussed. Here the number of administra-
tors are represented by the tokens in place Idle adm, the number of servers
are represented by the tokens in place Idle server , the number of users are
represented by the tokens in place Users .
Consider now one year of the deployment of the information security
technology in the network system, i.e., 124800 time units in the stochastic
Petri net model. Figure 10 shows the NPT of the system w.r.t. the numbers
of users for numbers of administrators K = 2, and K = 1. NPT increased
significantly when the numbers of users increase. The non-productive time
are similar due to the low load on the administrators and the administrators
often be idle in such a case.
10. The Cost Model for Administrators
Now we introduce a cost function which needs to be optimized. This
function is very useful when the numbers of protected documents and users
are high in large organizations. This function is based on the assumption
that there is a cost of the users’ waiting time and a competing cost of pro-
viding resources, e.g., salaries of administrators, and administrators’ training
expenditure. This gives rise to the following simple cost function (Mitrani
(1998); Zhao and Thomas (2010)):
C = c1Ladm + c2Kra, c1, c2 ≥ 0 (19)
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Figure 10: Total non-productive time (NPT) associated with the deployment of informa-
tion security technologies.
The cost rates ci(i = 1, 2) are non-negative constant, which are dependent
on the particular system, or depend on the type of quality of service contract
that is in place. If c1 is large, in order to keep the total cost C low, Ladm (the
average number of requests on the administrator) should be small (Mitrani
(1998)). At the same time, if c2 is large, in order to keep the total cost C low,
Kra should be small (the rate administrators need to help the users) (Mitrani
(1998)). However, the coefficients ci(i = 1, 2) are not necessarily optimal,
because the load of the administrators also plays a key role in determining
the best strategy, since the service time and the number of administrators
also influence the load of the administrators. In general, if the organizations
want to improve the responsiveness of the system, they would increase c1,
and if they want to minimize running costs, they would increase c2.
10.1. Analytical Results
We now illustrate the cost function we proposed above using the analytical
results we can get from previous section. Figure 11 shows the cost w.r.t. the
number of users. It is clear that under the parameter values with 1/ra =
4.5, c1 = 1, c2 = 0.5, more administrators bring more cost to the organization.
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However, when the number of users reach 640, the costs start to close towards
each other. In a small system, when N < 640, the cost function is dominated
by c2Kra. The reason is that the administrators will often be idle, and the
system is not making efficient use of resources.
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Figure 11: The cost w.r.t. the number of users calculated by the queuing network model
when c1 = 1, c2 = 0.5,
1
ra
= 4.5.
Figure 12 shows the cost w.r.t. the number of users. It is easy to see,
under the parameter values with 1/ra = 4.5, the cost rises rapidly at around
640 users for all cases (c2 = 0.05, 0.5, 5).
11. Conclusions
In this paper, we provided an approximate analytical model for investi-
gating the previous models test the aforementioned user-server-admin model.
We have also provided a corresponding simulation model based on stochas-
tic activity networks. The two approaches have been compared through a
series of experiments which demonstrated that the results they can supply
are very similar. Hence one can conclude that the approximate analytical
solution is sound. Moreover, we can conclude that the simulation technique
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Figure 12: The cost w.r.t. the number of users calculated by the queuing network model.
K = 2, 1ra = 4.5, c1 = 0.5.
based on stochastic activity networks can be relied upon when it comes to the
evaluation of, e.g., productivity loss caused by the introduction of security
technologies. In future we plan to apply it to system organizations which
extend the simple scenarios captured by Figure 1; in particular, those that
involve a hierarchy of servers and administrators.
We proposed functions to estimate the non-productive time (NPT) in an
organization resulting from the implementation of security technologies, and
the cost function for the administrators in the information help desk.
Queuing theory was used to numerically analyze the implementation of
information security technologies, and stochastic activity networks were used
to simulate the approach. The effect of several controllable parameters on
the performance of the system was examined in a series of numerical and
simulation experiments.
Sensitivity analysis is used to determine which of the parameters exerts
the most influence on the NPT of an corporation, in order to help information
security managers to balance the weight of information security expenses,
and make well informed security investment decisions. In this study, each
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parameter is assigned by value. Different values of the input parameters
would lead to different results. Such a study can help information security
managers to make information security investment decision.
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